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Abstract
Many partnership contracts (and other joint-venture agreements) include so-called
“Texas Shootout Clauses” to govern future breakups. In a Texas Shootout, one
partner names a single buy-sell price and the other partner has the option to buy or
sell at that price. While the prior literature has considered the allocative efficiency
of the Texas Shootout, this paper focuses on the incentives of private parties to
make these offers to begin with. We consider a model where sole ownership is
more efficient than joint ownership. Although both partners are equally capable,
one has private information about the common value of the asset. When given
the choice, they avoid making buy-sell offers because these offers give away bar-
gaining surplus (the partners are ”gun shy”). Instead, they often (but not always)
prefer to make simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell and bargaining failures
arise. Texas Shootout contracts that assign trigger rights - where one party can
force the other to name a price - increase efficiency and are jointly desirable.
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Many partnership contracts (and other joint-venture agreements) include so-called “Texas 
Shootout Clauses” to govern future breakups.  In a Texas Shootout, one partner names a single 
buy-sell price and the other partner has the option to buy or sell at that price. While the prior 
literature has considered the allocative efficiency of the Texas Shootout, this paper focuses on 
the incentives of private parties to make these offers to begin with.  We consider a model where 
sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership.  Although both partners are equally 
capable, one has private information about the common value of the asset.  When given the 
choice, they avoid making buy-sell offers because these offers give away bargaining surplus (the 
partners are "gun shy").  Instead, they often (but not always) prefer to make simple offers to buy 
or simple offers to sell and bargaining failures arise.   Texas Shootout contracts that assign 
trigger rights – where one party can force the other to name a price – increase efficiency and are 
jointly desirable.   
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1.  Introduction 
 This paper is concerned with the dissolution of common ownership agreements — such 
as closely-held corporations, partnerships, and limited-liability companies — where the external 
market for ownership interests is thin.  The absence of efficient ownership markets implies that 
dissolution effectively leads to a private auction among the members of the venture.  There are 
numerous ways of conducting this auction,1 as well as meaningful alternatives to an auction (e.g., 
negotiation, mediation, or liquidation), but we focus on a particular auctioning device known as a 
Texas Shootout.2  A Texas Shootout—so labeled because once initiated (or triggered) only one 
party will be ‘left standing’—is a buy-sell provision where a party names a price for her share of 
the venture and another other party decides whether to pay that price (i.e., buy out the first party) 
or to be paid that price (i.e., sell out to the first party).3   
 The practical implementation of a Texas Shootout is well-illustrated by the contested 
dissolution of Omnibus Financial Group (Omnibus).  Omnibus was organized as a limited 
liability company (LLC) by four investors (members) in 1996.  Two members withdrew within 
two years, leaving John Valinote and Stephen Ballis as co-member-managers of the venture.  
Valinote soon ceased participating in the venture and sought an exit strategy.  After some delay, 
Ballis announced a price for the business under the buy-sell clause in Omnibus’s operating 
                                                 
1
 See McAfee (1992) and Brams and Taylor (1996) for comparisons (in terms of efficiency and fairness) 
of various auctions that may be employed. 
2
 Texas shootouts are alternatively referred to in the literature as Texas auctions or the cake-cutting rule.  
Practitioners also refer to these auctions as Texas shootouts (RDO Foods Co. v. U.S. Int’l, Inc., 194 
F.Supp.2d 962, 2002), as well as shotgun provisions (Damerow Ford Co. v. Bradshaw, 876 P.2d 788, 
1994), Russian roulette agreements (Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 601 P.2d 475, 1979), put-call 
options (Resolution Trust Corp. v. Residential Developers Fund Partners, 1991 WL 193363 (E.D.Pa) 
1991) and simply buy-sell mechanisms (Universal Studios Inc. v Viacom Inc., 705 A.2d. 579, 1997).  
Though these terms are often used interchangeable in practice, we will treat shootouts as a special class of 
buy-sell agreement where the price is determined uniquely by the offeror.   
3
 Some shootout agreements allow any party to trigger them for any reason, while others require the 
occurrence of stipulated (often verifiable) events before they can be initiated. 
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agreement, which invited Valinote to buy or sell at that price.4  Valinote opted to sell his fifty 
percent stake, allowing Ballis to continue the business without the disruption and transaction 
costs associated with a negotiated separation or liquidation.5   
 Because of their potential for efficient and fair dissolution of common ownership 
agreements, shootout clauses have practically become boilerplate.6  Despite their widespread use, 
shootout provisions have received only limited attention in the academic literature.  We consider 
a simple extensive-form game where two partners initially share joint ownership of an asset.  
Later, an event occurs that makes joint ownership inefficient: the value of the underlying asset is 
higher if one partner has sole control.    Bargaining is complicated by the fact that one of the 
partners has private information about a common underlying value of the asset.7   In our model, 
Texas Shootouts dissolve the partnership efficiently by removing the "status quo" of joint 
ownership from the bargaining table.  While Texas Shootout contracts are jointly efficient, they 
are under-utilized by the partners ex post.  A partner -- whether he is informed or uninformed -- 
can usually capture greater equilibrium rents through simple offers to buy or simple offers to 
sell.8  We show that buy-sell offers are made in the signaling equilibrium only when the common 
                                                 
4
 Valinote v. Ballis, 295 F.3d 666 (7th Cir., 2000).  The initiation of a buy-sell clause often imposes 
several formal requirements, including giving proper written notice, postings of deposits or bonds or both, 
and the triggering of time periods within which the other party must accept the buy-sell offer and close.  
A party’s failure to meet these requirements may have severe detrimental consequences for that party. 
5
 Ballis actually announced a value of -$1,581.29 per one percent interest in the business (i.e., the 
business had negative value) and thus by choosing to sell his interest in the business, Valinote $79,064 to 
Ballis.   
6
 The importance of buy-sell agreements is now so broadly recognized that a lawyer’s failure to 
recommend or include them in modern joint venture agreements is considered “malpractice” among legal 
scholars and practitioners.   
7
 Texas Shootouts would be unnecessary for efficiency under symmetric information. Rational partners 
would easily negotiate a price for the sale of the asset.   
8
 Suppose that it is commonly known that the joint asset is $0 if the two partners stay together, but is 
worth $2 with concentrated ownership.  In other words, there is $2 of bargaining surplus on the table.  
Suppose that Partner 1 can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Partner 2.  The best buy-sell offer that 
Partner 1 could make is p = $1, giving each of the two partners half of the bargaining surplus.  Partner 1 
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value is in an intermediate range and the gains from trade are not too large.  The threat to remain 
with the "status quo" of joint ownership is used strategically to extract rents in bargaining and, in 
the process, destroys joint value.  The idea that making a buy-sell offer may not be unilaterally 
profitable has been largely overlooked by practitioners and academics. 
 Since private parties have an insufficient incentive to make buy-sell offers ex post, we 
argue that it is in their interest to write restrictive contracts ex ante to encourage their use.   We 
first consider clauses that make shootouts mandatory for partnership dissolution.  We show that 
when gains from trade are high then a coordination game arises: although both partners want to 
dissolve their partnership, neither wants to be the one to make the buy-sell offer.9  Although 
equilibria exist where the partnership is dissolved efficiently, there may be a risk of coordination 
failure.   For this reason, it makes sense for the partners to contractually assign "trigger rights" ex 
ante, giving one or both partners the right to compel the other partner to make a buy-sell offer.  
When the gains from trade are small, however, the uninformed partner credibly refrains from 
making buy-sell offers. 
 The formal economics literature has, for the most part, focused on direct revelation 
mechanisms for allocating partnership assets and has not considered the strategic use of buy-sell 
offers in decentralized bargaining.10  Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) first characterized 
the set of incentive-compatible interim-individually-rational dissolution mechanisms in the 
independent private values context.  They demonstrated that ex post efficient allocations may be 
reached where parties have roughly equal ex ante ownership stakes in the asset (such as with 
                                                                                                                                                             
can clearly capture the entire bargaining surplus with a simple offer to buy Partner 2's stake for a penny 
or, analogously, to sell his stake for just under $2. 
9
   The property that the offeror does worse than the offeree is not unique to our model  It appears in 
McAfee's (1992) model with independent private values among others.   
10
 Cf. e.g., Minehart and Neeman (1999), who examine termination and coordination of activities in 
partnerships, and Levin and Tadelis (2002), who focus on investment in partnerships and organizational 
form. 
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equal partners), unlike the case, for instance, where one party begins with complete ownership 
(Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983).  However, the Texas Shootout is not an efficient allocation 
mechanism in this context (McAfee 1992; Minehart and Neeman 1999).11  Jehiel and Pauzner 
(2002) and Fieseler et. al. (2003) employ a mechanism design approach to the partnership 
dissolution problem where parties have interdependent values and are asymmetrically informed 
and show that efficiency is even harder to achieve in this setting.  (See also Moldovanu 2001). 
 As the literature moved from the assumption of private values to interdependent or 
common values, some of the focus has shifted from bargaining efficiency to fairness concerns.  
See Morgan (2003) and Brams and Taylor (1996) for a survey of the fairness implications.12  The 
focus on fairness is justified, at least implicitly, by the observation that if an asset has a value that 
is common to all individual parties then no allocative efficiency implications are raised by an ex 
post assignment of ownership to one partner or the other.  In our model, however, Texas 
Shootouts raise salient efficiency implications even in the context of common values.  In this 
context shootouts restrict strategic behaviors that interfere with the allocation of the asset to one 
party or another when joint ownership is no longer desirable. 
The next section lays out the basic notation of the model.  The third section considers 
Texas Shootouts without restrictions.  The equilibrium strategies and outcomes are characterized 
where one party can make a final offer.  It is shown that buy-sell offers are underutilized -- the 
partners are "gun shy".  The fourth section focuses on contractual restrictions on Texas 
                                                 
11
 Ex post efficiency is achieved under full information and the parties prefer to be offerors rather than 
offerees, which flips under asymmetric information (McAfee 1992).  In a recent working paper, de Frutos 
and Kittsteiner (2004) argue that McAfee's inefficiency is mitigated if the parties bid to see who gets to be 
the offeror.  This essentially restores symmetry to an otherwise asymmetric mechanism and could be 
considered a form of "trigger right."  Their work and ours were pursued independently.   
12
 Morgan (2003: 4) “abstracts away from efficiency considerations entirely” based on the view that “with 
common values, all allocations are efficient.”  Morgan's also considers a common value model but his 
information structure is more general than ours.  He does not consider decentralized bargaining or the 
question of how the shootout is triggered.  Morgan's work and our own were pursued independently. 
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Shootouts and argues that the contract should allocate "trigger rights" to one or both partners 
where a partner can compel the other to make a buy-sell offer.  The final section discusses the 
implications, extensions, and limitations of the analysis.  Proofs, when omitted from the text, are 
given in the Appendix. 
 
2.  The Model 
 Suppose that two partners, i = 1, 2, initially have equal ownership of an asset whose 
(future) value is x.  Partner 1 is better informed than Partner 2: he privately observes the value of 
the asset, ]1,0[x∈ , which is non contractible and drawn from a commonly known distribution 
f(x).  Although presumably joint ownership of the assets was originally desirable, an event has 
occurred that makes joint ownership inefficient.  We assume that the value created by the asset is 
higher when under the sole control of one of the partners, ax + , where a  is a positive number.  
Although the underlying value of the asset, x, is privately observed by Partner 1 it is common 
knowledge that gains from trade, a > 0, exist.  The partners subsequently attempt to dissolve 
their partnership in the shadow of joint ownership where they each would receive half of the 
asset value, x/2.     
 The assumption that the asset creates more value with concentrated ownership may be 
justified in a number of different ways.  First, it may reflect an underlying moral-hazard-in-teams 
problem (Holmstrom, 1982) in which joint ownership leads to underinvestment relative to the 
socially efficient level.  Second, it may reflect private benefits of control that are outside the 
model.  A sole partner, for example, may gain disproportionate non-pecuniary benefits such as 
respect and prestige in the business community or disproportionate pecuniary benefits from 
invitations to serve on boards of directors.  Third, the partnership may, by its very nature, require 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art19
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investments from each partner that are duplicative at this stage in the firm's life cycle.13  Finally, 
but certainly not least likely, the partnership may be in deadlock,14 wherein irreconcilable 
differences between partners prevents the business from moving forward.15   
 We assume that the two partners are equally capable of running the firm alone.  We have 
adopted this assumption mainly for the purpose of streamlining the exposition: the notation is 
simpler and the proofs are shorter as a result.  Our results extend to positive asymmetric stakes 
where, for example, Partner 1 derives greater value from sole ownership than Partner 2.  Indeed, 
buy-sell clauses are often instigated by the death of one partner.  We would expect that the heirs 
to the deceased partner's shares are in a worse position to run the firm than the living partner. 16 
 Since the status quo of joint ownership is inefficient, the partners clearly have private 
incentives to dissolve their partnership. We assume that negotiations consist of a single take-it-
or-leave-it offer involving a price, ikp .  Indicator i refers to the partner making the offer, i = 1, 2.  
Indicator }T,S,B{k∈  tells whether it is an offer to buy at the given price (B), an offer to sell at 
that price (S), or a buy-sell offer which gives the receiver the option to either buy or sell at the 
                                                 
13
  The ongoing transactions costs of filing tax returns as a partner should be higher than, say, simply 
liquidating the asset and purchasing shares in an index fund instead.  To give an even more innocuous 
example, the transactions costs associated with partnerships may be higher since two signatures would be 
required on many partnership documents.   
14
 The generic definition of deadlock is “a complete standstill; lack of progress due to irreconcilable 
disagreement or equal opposing forces” (OED).  In a legal proceeding, a determination of deadlock 
allows the court to dissolve the joint venture agreement discharge appropriate remedies. Demonstration of 
deadlock will empower a court to dissolve the partnership if a party seeks a judicial resolution, however 
the issue of the efficient allocation of partnership assets is not an explicit objective of such proceedings.     
15
  Deadlock is a salient concern in corporations and LLCs, as well as in partnerships (Hoberman, 2001). 
“Deadlock in a closely held corporation arises when a control structure permits one or more factions of 
shareholders to block corporate action if they disagree with some aspect of corporate policy.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary.   
16
 To accommodate this concern, buy-sells that are triggered by death typically use a predetermined price 
(updated annually), and in many cases are structured as buy-out clauses, where the estate of the deceases 
must sell to the surviving partner(s) (see e.g., Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d. 1301, 1997).  There are 
additional normative implications when the partners’ competences are asymmetric.  The question 
becomes not only whether the partnership is dissolved (the avoidance of the status quo) but who gets sole 
control (allocative efficiency).   
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named price (T).  (The "T" refers to the Texas Shootout).  We will also use the following 
notation:  )x(π ikj  is the equilibrium probability that Partner j ends up owning the asset given the 
offer of type k made by Partner i and  )x(Sikj  will be Partner j's equilibrium surplus, or his 
payoff above the status quo payoff  x/2.   
 Finally, our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE).   In the game 
where Partner 1, the informed partner, makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer we refine the multiple 
equilibria by choosing the equilibrium in which Partner 1's offer fully reveals his private 
information.  This equilibrium is also the one that would be selected using Banks and Sobel's 
(1987) refinement of universal divinity (D1). 
 
3.  Unrestricted Shootouts 
 In this section we assume that there are no contractual agreements regulating the use of 
buy-sell offers.  Instead, a partner will choose to make a buy-sell offer (or choose to accept a 
buy-sell offer) only when it is in his private interest.  We will see that while the parties are more 
than willing to accept buy-sell offers they are "gun shy" when it comes to making them.  The 
reason is that the Texas Shootout mechanism gives a large part of the bargaining surplus to the 
other side, surplus that may be retained with simple offers to buy or sell.  Importantly, we will 
show that the parties' reluctance to make buy-sell offers reduces social welfare in the presence of 
asymmetric information. 
 To start, observe that the partner who receives a buy-sell offer at price "p" necessarily 
prefers buying or selling at p to rejecting the offer out-of-hand. To see this, suppose that the 
receiver believes that the asset is worth E(x) on average, so if he rejects the buy-sell offer he 
receives an expected status quo payoff of E(x)/2.  When p > E(x)/2 he clearly prefers selling at 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art19
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price p to joint ownership.  On the other hand, if p < E(x)/2 then his expected payoff from 
buying at price p, pa)x(E −+ , is also larger than his status quo payoff E(x)/2.  So the receiver 
of the buy-sell offer -- whether informed or uninformed -- necessarily prefers buying or selling at 
any named price to remaining with the status quo payoff. 
 In contrast, the partners are very reluctant to make buy-sell offers.  This is easily 
illustrated for the special case where x is commonly known.  Partner 1's best shootout offer, T1p , 
may be found by backwards induction.  Given a price, T1p , Partner 2 will certainly sell to 
Partner 1 if T1T1 paxp −+> , or equivalently 2
axT1p +> , and will buy when 2
axT1p +< .  
Working backwards in time, it is not hard to see that the best offer (from Partner 1's perspective) 
makes Partner 2 indifferent between buying and selling: 2
axT1p += .17   Note that in equilibrium 
the two partners share the bargaining surplus equally: 2/a)x(S)x(S T12T11 == .  It is easy to see 
why Partner 1 will never voluntarily choose to make a buy-sell offer.  He can extract all of the 
bargaining surplus, a, through a simple offer to buy Partner 2 out for a price 2/xp B1 =  (plus a 
penny, perhaps) or through a simple offer to sell his share for a2/xp S1 +=  (minus a penny).18 
                                                 
17
 If 2
axT1p +>  then Partner 2 strictly prefers to sell and Partner 1 could profitably lower the price.  If  
2
axT1p +<  then Partner 2 strictly prefers to buy and so Partner 1 could profitably raise the price.  Any 
probability of buying versus selling constitutes and equilibrium.  The payoffs of the two parties are the 
same whether Partner 2 buys or sells. 
18
 This reluctance would also appear in an infinitely repeated version of this model.  To see why, suppose 
the partners believe that the Texas Shootout will be invoked at date t+1 where they will split the surplus 
equally.  Partner 2's outside option when viewed from at date t is 2/)ax(δ +  where δ is the discount 
factor.  Partner 1 surely prefers a simple offer to buy Partner 2's stake at date t for 2/)ax(δpB +=  to a 
buy-sell offer where he splits the surplus 50/50.  We conjecture that this game will feature delay when the 
partners are privately informed about the common value of the asset. 
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    The next sections show that with symmetric information the partners are still reluctant to 
make buy-sell offers, even though simple offers to buy and a simple offers to sell lead to 
bargaining breakdowns in where the status quo is maintained .19    
   
3.1  The Informed Partner Makes the Offer 
 This section characterizes the fully separating equilibrium that arises when Partner 1, the 
informed partner, can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.  As in the illustration above, the offeror 
shies away from buy-sell offers in the presence of asymmetric information because he or she 
often captures a greater share of the bargaining surplus through simple offers to buy or simple 
offer to sell.  In particular, when the common value x is sufficiently low, Partner 1 offers to sell 
her shares to Partner 2.  On the other hand, when the value of x is sufficiently high then Partner 1 
offers to buy Partner 2's shares.  Only in an intermediate range will Partner 1 voluntarily choose 
to make a buy-sell offer.  In all three regions, the offer makes Partner 2 indifferent and he 
subsequently randomizes among his options.   
 
Proposition 1:  When the informed partner, Partner 1, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Partner 
2 there is a unique fully separating equilibrium.  Letting )}4ln(,2/1min{ˆ ax = , 
i. if  xx ˆ≤  Partner 1 offers to sell his shares to Partner 2 for axxp S += 2/)(1 ; 
axS ex 2/12 )( −=π , 0)x(π S11 = , a2/xS11 ae)x(S −=  and 0)x(S S12 =  ; 
                                                 
19
 The Coase conjecture, that bargaining will resolve itself in the "twinkling of an eye," does not extend to 
common value bargaining games, even when it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist.  See 
Vincent's common value bargaining model (1989).   A more familiar manifestation is Akerlof's (1970) 
Market for Lemons.   
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art19
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ii. if  ]ˆ1,ˆ( xxx −∈  Partner 1 makes a buy-sell offer: 2/)()(1 axxp T += ; 
2/1)x(π)x(π T12T11 == , and 2/a)x(S)x(S T12T11 == ; 
iii. if xx ˆ1−>  Partner 1 offers to buy Partner 2's shares for 2/)(1 xxp B = ;  
axB ex 2/)1(11 )( −−=π , 0)x(π B12 = , a2/)x1(B11 ae)x(S −−=  and 0)x(S B12 = . 
 
 We see in part (i) of the Proposition that if x = 0 (so the asset is worthless when owned 
jointly) that Partner 1 offers to sell the asset for a)x(p S1 =  and Partner 2 accepts this offer for 
sure: 1)0(π S12 = .  Partner 1 is able to extract the entire bargaining surplus, a, at this extreme.   
When x rises the equilibrium has the feature that axxp S += 2/)(1  and Partner 2 is indifferent 
and randomizes between accepting and rejecting.20  Note that Partner 2's probability of 
acceptance, axS ex 2/12 )( −=π , is falling in the common value of the asset, x.  This is necessary for 
incentive compatibility.  
 This may be understood intuitively.  When Partner 1's offers are higher -- signaling that 
the value x is higher as well -- then a lower probability of acceptance is necessary in order to 
maintain incentive compatibility for Partner 1.  This lower probability of acceptance prevents 
Partner 1 from exaggerating and pretending to have a "plum" rather than a "lemon."  It is also 
important to notice that Partner 1 is capturing equilibrium rents and that Partner 1's rents fall as x 
rises.  Partner 2, on the other hand, receives no rents here.  He is indifferent between purchasing 
the shares and the status quo of joint ownership. Partner 1's equilibrium surplus from the simple 
offer to sell is proportional to the probability of acceptance and is depicted in Figure 1. 
                                                 
20
 If he rejects the offer he gets the status quo payoff of x/2, and if he accepts he gets 
2/x)x(pax S1 =−+  as well. 
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Figure 1: 
Partner 1's Surplus in the Signaling Equilibrium 
 
 When x is high, Partner 1 will choose to make a simple offer to buy in favor of a simple 
offer to sell.  The equilibrium, as characterized in part (iii) of the proposition, is the mirror image 
of part (i).  When 1x =  -- its highest level -- Partner 1 offers to buy Partner 2's shares for 2/1  
and Partner 2 always accepts, 1)1(π B11 = .  There is no reason for Partner 2 to be dubious here:  
2/1  is his status quo payoff when x takes on its highest value -- an excellent price!  Notice that 
Partner 1 extracts all of the surplus, a , through this offer to buy when 1x = .  More generally, 
when x falls below 1 then Partner 1 offers 2/)(1 xxp B =  and the probability of acceptance, 
axB ex 2/)1(11 )( −−=π , is rising in the offer. Again, this is necessary to maintain incentive 
compatibility.  Partner 1's rents, )x(πa B11 , are rising in x, the common value of the asset and 
equal a when x = 1. 
Texas Shootout 
Simple Offer 
to Sell 
Simple Offer 
to Buy 
x 
surplus 
½ a 
a 
 
1 xˆ1−xˆ
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 Now suppose that Partner 1 makes a Texas Shootout offer with price, Tp1 .  Partner 2 can 
buy that price, giving the two partners payoffs },{ 11 TT paxp −+ , or can sell at that price giving 
payoffs },{ 11 TT ppax −+ .  The separating equilibrium with the Texas Shootout has a 
particularly simple form.  Partner 1 offers to split the value fairly with the uninformed partner, 
2/)()(1 axxp T += , making Partner 2 indifferent between buying and selling.  Partner 2 
subsequently flips an evenly weighted coin to determine whether to buy or sell: 
2/1)x(π)x(π T12T11 ==  . 21 Partner 1 is, in fact, indifferent among the offers here and is happy to 
"tell the truth."  As in the symmetric information example presented earlier, Partner 1 and Partner 
2 share the bargaining surplus, each receiving a/2. 
 It is not hard to see why Partner 1 is "gun shy," avoiding the buy-sell offer at the 
extremes of the distribution.  Suppose that Partner 1 knows that the asset is a plum: x = 1.  He 
will capture the whole surplus, a, with a simple offer to buy the asset from Partner 2 for 
2/1p B1 = .   Similarly, if x = 0  then Partner 1 can capture the whole surplus by making a 
simple offer to sell the asset for 0p S1 = .22  In the middle range, however, incentive 
compatibility requires that the simple offers be rejected with probability greater than one half.  It 
is therefore in Partner 1's interest to use the Texas Shootout, guaranteeing himself exactly half of 
the surplus.  Indeed, the cutoff )}4ln(,2/1min{ˆ ax =  is where Partner 1's surplus is a/2 whether 
he makes a simple offer to buy or a buy-sell offer.  Similarly, when xˆ1x −=  then Partner 1 is 
indifferent between a simple offer to sell and a buy-sell offer. 
 
                                                 
21
 Morgan (2003) has a "purified" version of this result in a more general model.  He does not, however, 
consider the possibility that players can make simple offer, nor does he consider the coordination 
problems and trigger rights discussed later.  
22
 Plus a penny, perhaps.  As before, Partner 2 will accept this offer regardless of his beliefs. 
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Corollary 1:  If 1)]4ln(2[a −<  then ]xˆ1,xˆ( −  is a non-empty set and Partner 1 makes a buy-
sell offer with positive probability in equilibrium.  When 1)]4ln(2[a −≥  then ]xˆ1,xˆ( −  is an 
empty set and no buy-sell offers are made. 
 
3.2  The Uninformed Partner Makes the Offer 
 Suppose instead that the uninformed partner, Partner 2, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
to Partner 1.  We will first characterize Partner 2's best buy-sell offer and then show that Partner 
2 will never voluntarily make it.  From Partner 2's perspective, the best buy-sell offer is 
dominated by either a simple offer to buy or a simple offer to sell. 
 Consider a Texas Shootout where Partner 2, the uninformed partner, names a price Tp2 .  
Being informed about the true common value, x, Partner 1 would "buy" instead of "sell" if and 
only if  TT ppax 22 >−+ .  This implies a cutoff, ap2x T2T2 −= , where Partner 1 buys when x 
is above the cutoff and sells when x is below the cutoff.  We can think of Partner 2's problem as 
finding the best cutoff, Tx2 , and corresponding offer, 2/)( 22 axp TT += , to maximize his 
expected payoff:  
 ∫ ++∫ +−+=
1
0
2 )(]2/)[()(]2/)([maxarg
z
z
z
T dxxfazdxxfazaxx .     (1) 
Differentiating this expression and setting the derivative equal to zero shows that the cutoff 
satisfies 
 0)(21 2 =− TxF .            (2) 
In other words, Partner 2's favorite offer corresponds to the median of the distribution.  
Intuitively, Partner 2 is just indifferent between raising and lowering the offer because there is a 
50/50 chance that he will buy versus sell at the named price. 
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Lemma 1:  Partner 2's best Texas Shootout offer, 2/)ax(p T2 += , corresponds to the median 
of the type distribution, x .   
(i) If xx <  then Partner 1 sells his shares to Partner 2.  0)x(π T21 = , 1)x(π T22 = , 
2
axx)x(S T21
+−
= , and 
2
axx)x(S T22
+−
=  . 
(ii) If xx >  then Partner 1 buys Partner 2's shares.  1)x(π T21 = , 0)x(π T22 = , 
2
axx)x(S T21
+−
= , and 
2
axx)x(S T22
+−
=  .  
 
 Despite the fact that the Texas Shootout may be desirable for the two partners jointly, 
Partner 2 will never find it in his individual interest to make the buy-sell offer -- he is "gun shy."  
The Texas Shootout is an unusually unattractive mechanism from Partner 2's perspective.  If the 
asset is a "plum", xx > , then Partner 1 will buy out Partner 2 at an "average"  price.  If the asset 
is a "lemon," xx ≤ , then Partner 1 sells out an average price and Partner 2 is stuck with a less 
valuable asset.  In both cases, Partner 2 is getting the short end of the stick. 
 
Proposition 2:  The uninformed partner, Partner 2, never voluntarily makes a buy-sell offer.  He 
prefers making either a simple offer to buy the asset or a simple offer to sell the asset instead.   
 
Proof:  Using the Lemma, Partner 2's expected surplus from the Texas Shootout is: 
 )x(dF
2
axx)x(dF
2
axxdFx)x(S
1
x
x
0
1
0
T2
2 ∫ 


 +−
+∫ 


 +−
=∫  
or  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 16 






∫ −+∫ −+





=∫ )x(dF)xx()x(dF)xx(a2
1dFx)x(S
1
x
x
0
1
0
T2
2  .    (3) 
Suppose instead that Partner 2 makes a simple offer to sell the asset to Partner 1 for ax +2/ .  
Partner 1 accepts if x is above the median and rejects the offer if x is below the median, the same 
cutoff as before.  (If Partner 1 accepts the offer Partner 1 receives payoff )2/( axax +−+  and if 
he rejects Partner 2 receives his status quo payoff x/2.  These are equal when xx = .)  Partner 2's 
expected surplus from this simple offer to sell is: 
 






∫ −+





=∫ 



−+∫ +



−
1
x
1
x
x
0
)x(dF)xx(a
2
1)x(dF
2
x
a
2
x)x(dF
2
x
2
x
.   (4) 
Comparing (3) and (4) shows that the latter is missing a negative term, 0)x(dF)xx(
x
0
<∫ − .  We 
conclude that Partner 2 strictly prefer the simple offer to sell for ax +2/ .  A similar argument 
can be made, of course, to show that he would also prefer a simple offer to buy.23  
Q.E.D. 
 
 Intuitively, Partner 2 would rather use the simple offer to buy or the simple offer to sell to 
create a threat of breakdown for Partner 1.  This threat strengthens Partner 1's private incentive to 
accept hard-ball offers.  Although this lead to inefficient breakdowns in equilibrium, it increases 
Partner 2's share of the bargaining surplus. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Note that these are not Partner 2's best offers.  It is not difficult to show that he would make an offer to 
sell for axp SS += 2/22  where 0)(2)(1 22 =−− SS xafxF  or an offer to buy for 2/22 BB xp =  where 
0)()(2 22 =− BB xFxaf .    
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4.  Contractual Restrictions on Shootouts 
The last section of the paper showed that the partners' natural reluctance to make buy-sell 
offers, combined with asymmetric information, leads to the inefficient continuation of joint asset 
ownership.  The possibility of ex post inefficiency suggests that partners would find it in their 
interest to write contracts ex ante to encourage their future use.  This section will consider two 
types of provisions.  The first, the "mandatory shootout," states that partnerships must be 
dissolved through shootouts and effectively prohibits the partners from making simple offers to 
buy or simple offers to sell.  Partnership agreements sometimes include mandatory buy-sell 
provisions, 24 though practitioners often advise against this (Welborn 1990).   The second 
provision allocates "trigger rights" to the partners where one (or both) can compel the other to 
pull the trigger and place a buy-sell offer on the table.   
 
4.1  Mandatory Shootout Clauses 
 Let's first consider mandatory shootouts using the following simultaneous move game.  
First, each partner may place a buy-sell offer on the table.  (If both partners make buy-sell offers 
then a coin is flipped to choose the active offer.)  Second, the receiver of the offer decides 
whether to buy or sell at the named price.  Each partner would prefer the other to "pull the 
trigger" for a simple reason:  When the informed party makes the buy-sell offer the bargaining 
surplus is divided evenly, but when the uninformed partner makes the offer the allocation is 
uneven.25  The next Lemma states that when the gains from trade are small then Partner 2, the 
uninformed partner, prefers the status quo to making a buy-sell offer. 
                                                 
24
 See e.g., Lyon Dev. Co. v. Business Men’s Assurance Co. of America, 76 F.3d 1118). 
25
 Recall that Partner 2 is at an information disadvantage and gets less than half of the bargaining surplus 
when he makes the offer. 
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Lemma 2:  When ∫−=<
1
x
)x(xdF2)x(Eaˆa  then Partner 2 prefers to make no offer at all to 
making a buy-sell offer.   When aˆa >  then Partner 2 prefers making the buy-sell offer to making 
no offer at all. 
  
Proof:  Partner 2 would never voluntarily make a buy-sell offer when the expected surplus 
(relative to the status quo) is negative.  From section 3, Partner 2's expected surplus from the 
buy-sell offer is 






∫ −+∫ −+





=∫ )x(dF)xx()x(dF)xx(a2
1dFx)x(S
1
x
x
0
1
0
T2
2 .  Rearranging terms 
shows that this is positive if and only if aˆa >  where aˆ  is defined in the Lemma. 
Q.E.D. 
 
 This result may be understood intuitively.  Suppose that the bargaining surplus, a,  is very 
small so the status quo is almost as efficient as concentrated ownership.  Partner 2, the 
uninformed partner, has no incentive to make a shootout offer: If he names an "average" price 
then Partner 1 will buy when x is above average and sell when x is below average, giving Partner 
2 less than remaining with the status quo.  He is getting the "short end of the stick," so to speak.  
As the bargaining surplus grows the figurative "stick" is getting longer.  Although Partner 2 is 
still getting the short end of the stick, there comes a point where he prefers the short end of the 
stick to having no stick at all.  
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that the contract includes a "mandatory shootout clause."    
(i) If aˆa <  then Partner 1 makes a buy-sell offer. 
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(ii) If aˆa ≥  then there are three equilibria: (1) Partner 1 makes a buy-sell offer, (2) Partner 2 
makes a buy-sell offer, (3) Partners 1 and 2 mix between making buy-sell offers and 
refraining from doing so. 
 
When aˆa < , Lemma 2 tells us that Partner 2 will refuse to make the offer.  In this case, 
Partner 1 bites the bullet, pull the trigger, and shares the surplus evenly with Partner 2.  As the 
parameter a rises, then Partner 2's unilateral incentive to make a buy-sell offer rises as well.  
When aˆa ≥  there is a coordination game where each partner is willing to make a buy-sell offer 
but would prefer to be on the receiving end instead.26   As in the famous game of Chicken, a 
coordination failure or stalemate can arise in the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium.   
 The main insights of this paper are important in practice.  The reluctance of private 
parties to make buy-sell offers is illustrated by the well-known case of Owen v. Cohen (1941).27 
This case involved the dissolution of a bowling-alley partnership in Burbank, California.  After 
enduring several breaches of the partnership agreement — and personal mistreatment by Cohen28 
— Owen demanded that his partner “make an offer either to buy out his [Owen’s] interest in the 
business or to sell to him.”  In flatly rejecting this solicitation, Cohen replied, “it would cost 
[Owen] plenty to get rid of him.” 
A mandatory shootout clause, which might have assisted Owen, could be enforced in a 
variety of ways.  First, the agreement would be self-enforcing if one partner could sue for 
                                                 
26
   MacAfee (1992) shows that partners prefer receiving offers to making them in a model with 
independent private values.  He does not, however, consider the possibility that the partners will make 
simple offers to buy or sell. 
27
 19 Cal.2d 147. 
28
 The court found that in addition to shirking his management responsibilities (allegedly informing Owen 
that he “had not worked yet in 47 years and he did not intend to start now”), Cohen wrongly appropriated 
partnership funds, sought to open an illegal “gambling room on the second floor of the bowling –alley 
property”, and engaged in persistent efforts to “humiliate [Owen] before the employees and customers of 
the bowling-alley.” 
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damages if the other partner dared to make a simple offer to buy (or a simple offer to sell).  
Alternatively, this agreement would be enforced through the involvement of a third party who 
would receive payments if the two partners ever deviated and negotiated a side deal.  There is a 
practical alternative to these mechanisms, however: the assignment of trigger rights. 
 
4.2  Trigger Rights 
The potential for coordination failures identified in the last section can be solved if one  
(or both) partners is given the right to force the other to  initiate the shootout ("trigger rights").29    
When both parties have trigger rights they will "race" to compel the other to make a buy-sell 
offer and the partnership will be dissolved efficiently.  This is in stark contrast to the previous 
section where coordination failures and inefficiencies arise when each partner would like the 
other to name a price.30 
Our model does not tell us which partner should retain these trigger rights -- the Texas 
Shootout leads to the efficient allocation of assets regardless of who makes the buy-sell offer in 
our context.31  The analysis does suggest, however, that equity may better served when the 
informed party makes the offer for, in this case, the two partners ultimately share the bargaining 
surplus equally.32  This suggests that the design of Texas Shootouts may vary depending on 
whether the parties exist in a Rawlsian world, not knowing which partner is likely to be more 
                                                 
29
 Parties do sometimes negotiate over which partner will be required to make the shootout offer.  See 
e.g., Damerow Ford Co. v. Bradshaw, 876 P.2d 788 (1994). 
30
   Although not explicitly discussed by McAfee (1992), this coordination failure would arise with 
independent private values as well.   
31
 De Frutos and Kittsteiner suggest that allocative efficiency is higher when the parties bid to see who 
will be the receiver of the offer.  This is an ex post allocation of trigger rights. 
32
 In Damerow Ford Co. v. Bradshaw, the partners “entered a ‘shotgun agreement,’ under which Preble 
[the more-informed party] was to set a price for the [company’s] stock within 20 days and [the other 
partner] had the option either to sell (put) his shares to Preble at the set price or to buy (call) Preble’s 
shares at that price.” 
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informed, or if they can fairly predict who will know more about the value of the business upon 
dissolution.     
To give an example, since non-managing investors (such as, for example, limited 
partners) have weaker management and control rights over the assets and are less likely to 
participate in the business than managing investors (e.g., general partners), the parties can predict 
at the start of the relationship that non-managing investors will often, though not always, be less-
informed.  Thus limited partners, members in manager-managed LLCs and non-participating 
shareholders in closely held corporations should be willing to pay for trigger rights given their 
informational disadvantage.  Similarly, it should be more difficult to allocate trigger rights in 
ventures where investors do not begin with this informational disadvantage, such as general 
partnership, member-managed LLCs and LLPs.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
Though Texas Shootout contracts have long been used to restrict behaviors—strategic 
and otherwise—there remains ambiguity about the different ways they restrict and which 
restrictions serve efficiency.  Our paper is the first to consider the case of decentralized 
bargaining where the partners may, but are not required to, make buy-sell offers.  We showed 
that the partners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to either buy or sell.  Naming a 
single price and giving the receiver the option to either buy or sell at that price transfers 
bargaining surplus to the receiver, surplus that could be retained through more traditional offers.  
Because of their hesitation to share this bargaining surplus (in addition to concerns about 
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subsequent legal challenges arising out of tax implications33 and fiduciary duty claims34), parties 
will be reluctant to make buy-sell offers.  We showed that in the presence of asymmetric 
information, the reluctance to use buy-sell offers leads to bargaining failures where value is 
destroyed.35  These inefficiencies may be avoided through contractual clauses that mandate the 
use of shootouts, although coordination failures may arise.  "Trigger rights," or the right to force 
the other partner to make a buy-sell offer, will unambiguously lead to an efficient outcome.   
 There may be other reasons why partners write Texas Shootout clauses in their 
partnership agreements. Shootouts may, for example, serve the useful function of preventing 
departing members from transferring their ownership interests to third parties without the 
approval of the remaining members of the venture.  A more common means of limiting such 
transfers is, of course, a right of first refusal.  A right of first refusal gives the remaining 
members the right to purchase the departing member’s interest at the price offered to the third 
party.   There are also often statutory constraints on transferring full ownership interests to third 
parties without the prior approval of the remaining parties to the venture (see e.g., the Uniform 
Partnership Act).  Furthermore, given the statutory and common law limits on shootouts (e.g., 
                                                 
33
 “The initiating partner can also expect legal challenge if adverse tax consequences could follow from a 
resulting dissolution, which will be considered a sale or exchange of partnership property or discharge of 
indebtedness.” Welborn (1993, pp.62-3). 
34Offerees often subsequently challenge the price as a low-ball offer in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by 
the offeror.  These challenges to low-ball offers usually occur when the offeree faces some liquidity 
constraint and is therefore unable to buy, leaving only the option of selling at a low price.  Courts treat the 
price under a Texas shootout buy-sell as only presumptively fair; they will consider other evidence to 
determine whether the price was a fair measure of value.  If it is deemed unfair (e.g., too low) the offeror 
may face penalties.  Sometimes even a high-price could be considered unfair and a breach of fiduciary 
duty.  In Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (601 P.2d 475), Georgia-Pacific admitted “that one of its 
objectives was to make the offer price sufficiently high to prevent the Montana group [its partner] 
from opting to purchase [Georgia-Pacific’s] shares under the buy-sell agreement.” 
35
 This was illustrated in Owen v. Cohen (1941).  See also, for example, Rochez Bros., Inc. v. 
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (1974), where the soon-to-be separated co-venturers  began discussing a 
buy-sell agreement in spring of 1967, but it was not until September 11, 1967 that Rochez Bros. 
named a price. 
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fiduciary constraints), they may simply serve as a mechanism for bringing parties to the 
bargaining table (Welborn 1993).  The relative advantages of alternative motivations, and the 
possible complementarities among them, remain fruitful areas for future study. 
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7.  Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:    
 Suppose Partner 1 makes a buy-sell offer to Partner 2 that perfectly reveals his type, 
)x(p T1 .  Partner 2's response must be mixed; if )x~(p)xˆ(p T1T1 >  and 2/1)x~(π)xˆ(π T12T12 ==  
(for example) then Partner 1 would pretend to be of type xˆ  when he was in fact of type x~ .  
Partner 2 mixing implies indifference, so 2/)ax()x(p T1 += .  Incentive compatibility for 
Partner 1 implies that type x doesn't want to mimic the offer made by another type xˆ : 
]2/)axˆ(x)][xˆ(π1[2/)axˆ)(xˆ(π T12T12 +−−++  
     ]2/)ax(x)][x(pi1[2/)ax)(x(pi T12T12 +−−++≤  
for all x and xˆ .  This inequality implies that 
 02/1)xˆ(π)xxˆ(
xˆ
)xˆ(π T1
2
T1
2
=−+−
∂
∂
 
when xˆx = , so 2/1)xˆ(π T12 = . 
 Suppose Partner 1 makes a simple offer sell his share to Partner 2 for price Sp1 .  Partner 
2 can accept the offer giving the two partners payoffs },{ 11 SS paxp −+ , or reject the offer 
giving the two parties their joint ownership payoffs }2/,2/{ xx .  In the fully separating 
equilibrium, Partner 2 is indifferent and randomizes between accepting and rejecting the offer.  
Indifference between accepting and rejecting the offer requires that axxp S += 2/)(1  -- Partner 2 
gets none of the surplus.  To find the probability of acceptance, suppose that Partner 1's true type 
is x but he offers axp S += )2/~(1 , his payoff is )2/)](~(1[])2/~)[(~( 1212 xxaxx SS ππ −++  . 
Differentiating this expression with respect to x~  and rearranging terms gives 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 26 
0
2
)~(]22~[)
~( 1212
=+−+
x
xax
dx
xd SS ππ
 . In equilibrium, Partner 1 perfectly reveals his type 
through the offer so xx =~ .  Substituting and setting the expression equal to zero gives a first-
order differential equation: 
 0)()(2 12
1
2
=+ x
dx
xd
a S
S
π
π
. 
Now we can solve the differential equation to get the acceptance probability.  In general, the 
function must satisfy axS cex 2/12 )( −=π  where c is an arbitrary constant.  Partner 1's surplus is 
axxS SS )()( 1211 π= .  Since )(12 xSπ  is decreasing in x it will bind at the bottom where 1)0(12 =Sπ  
and so we have 1=c .  Partner 1 receives surplus axS aexS 2/11 )( −= . 
 Suppose instead that Partner 1 makes an offer to buy the asset.  In a perfectly separating 
equilibrium partner 2 must randomize between accepting and rejecting, so 2/)(1 xxp B = , Partner 
2's outside option.  Suppose that Partner 1's true type is x but he offers 2/~1 xp B = .  His expected 
payoff would be )2/)](~(1[)2/~)(~( 1111 xxxaxx BB ππ −+−+  .  Differentiating this expression with 
respect to x~  and rearranging terms gives 
2
)~(]2~2[)
~( 1111 xxax
dx
xd BB ππ
−−+  . In equilibrium 
Partner 1 chooses  2/)(1 xxp B =  so xx =~ .  Substituting into the expression above and 
rearranging terms gives first-order differential equation: 
 0)()(2 11
1
1
=− x
dx
xd
a B
B
π
π
. 
Now we can solve this to get the acceptance probability.  In general, the acceptance function 
must satisfy axB cex 2/11 )( =π  where c is an arbitrary constant.  Partner 1's surplus is 
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axxS BB )()( 1111 π= .  Since )(11 xBπ  is increasing in x it will bind at the top where 1)1(11 =Bπ , so 
aec 2/1−=  and axB ex 2/)1(11 )( −−=π .  Partner 1 receives surplus axB aexS 2/)1(11 )( −−= . 
 Finally, )()( 1111 xSxS SB ≥  if and only if 2/1≥x ; )()( 1111 xSxS TS ≥  if and only if 
)4ln(ax ≤ ; )()( 1111 xSxS TB ≥  if and only if )4ln(1 ax −≥ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:   If neither partner makes an offer then the status quo is maintained where 
each receives x/2.  If the informed partner makes the offer then in the continuation equilibrium 
they will split the surplus evenly, each receiving (x+a)/2.  If the uninformed partner, Partner 2, 
makes the buy-sell offer then the surplus is not divided evenly, however.  Partner 1, the receiver 
of the offer, earns information rents:  If  ap2x T2 −<  then Partner 1 would sell and earn more 
than (x+a)/2; if the price ap2x T2 −>  then Partner 1 would buy and earn more than (x+a)/2. 
For aˆa <  it is a dominant strategy for Partner 2 to remain passive and wait for an offer from 
Partner 1.  When aˆa >  then Partner 2 prefers making a Texas Shootout offer to the status quo; if 
Partner 2 expects Partner 1 to refrain from making an offer then Partner 2 will choose make the 
offer instead.  A similar argument can be made for Partner 1.  In sum, when aˆa >  the 
simultaneous move game is a coordination game and, of course, a third mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists. 
Q.E.D. 
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